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Viruses can be transferred from wild and domestic animals to humans
in a process called zoonosis
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·-Welcome
Welcome Dr Franklin and thank you for joining us to help social workers in(:reilse""
m1::reasi'•;"
their knowledge about the interconnectedness of humans, other mammals
the environment. Let's begin with zoonosis.
di:se.Jlses J.1ik'e
Can you explain zoonosis to us and the process that leads to dhieases
COVID-19?

betvV~e~
Zoonosis is where a disease-causing pathogen is transmitted naturally betvv~<:!~
vertebrate animals and humans (adapted from Botzler & Brown, 2614;,2614; . ·
Wobeser 2006). Botzler and Brown (2014) further partition the definition of
of,'::·:
zoonoses into zooanthroponoses (pathogens are transmitted to humans when!
where
transmitted :
humans are a dead-end host) and anthropozoonoses (pathogens are trarismitted:
from humans to non-humans where the nonhumans a~e a dead-end host). In
a.species serves as a host for the pathoboth cases, dead-end hosts are where a,species
gen but does not serve as a source of the pathog.en
pathog,en for another host (Botzler,
(Botzler.
&
&: Brown, 2014).
Two types of hosts are of concern in zoonotic pathogen transmission: mainteorie or more epidemi':'
epidemi.:.
nance and bridge host. Maintenance, or reservoir, hosts are one
ofogically connected populations where a pathogen is permanently "maintained
'maintained
ologically
al., 2(02).
2002). Bridge hosts provide a lirik between maintenance hosts
(Haydon et aL,
and target hosts, where the target hosts can be human _populations in the case
of zoonoses. To be considered a bridge host, a species must
theniust be competent for the·
pathogen to replicate within it and it must have infectious contacts with the target host (Caron et al.,
aL, 2015). Bridge hosts cannot maintain pathogen persistence
without additional inputs from maintenance hosts and, therefore, must overlap in
time and space with both maintenance hosts and target hosts to effectively link
the two. Interspecies transmission from a maintenance host to a non-maintenance
host~
host~ such as a bridge host, is referred to as spillover transmission, and the recipients or secondary hosts as spillover hosts. Such spillover can play important roles .·
& Mitchell 2004) and non-maintenance hosts can
in pathogen dynamics (Power &
ultimately become maintenance hosts if the pathogen evolves within the new
host. Nugent (2011) also used the term spillback to describe transmission froni
from
non-maintenance to maintenance hosts but acknowledged that maintenance
transmission in one set of circumstances might be defined as either spillover or
spillback, depending on the situation.
There are 1,145 known infectious organisms that are pathogenic to humans,
which include vIruses,
protoioans, and helminths
viruses, prions, bacteria, fungi, protozoans,
2001). Of these, 61% arezooriotic
are zoorfotic infectious diseases, making
(Taylor 'et al., 2001).
up most of the diseases affecting humans. Of the novel pathogens that have
1940s,75% have been-zoonotic
been·zoonotic and most have emerged from·.·
emerged since the 1940s,75%have
from-"
wildlife Qones
Oones et al., 2008). Oftentimes, the pathogens that cause diseases are
relatively benign and do not cause disease in their natural hosts. However, when
the pathogens jump to another species, these pathogens can become much more
virulent in the new host, causing disease that can sometimes have devastating
consequences.
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What do we know so far about the origins ofSARS-CoV-2?.
ofSARS-CoV-2?'

~he World Health Organization (WHO) c~nvened
c~nvened a team of
In January 2021, ~he
scientists to examine the origins of SARS-CoV-2. This team recently released
examIned four plausible scenarios. These
their report (WHO, 2020), which examined
scenarios were:
1. Direct zoonotic transmission where there was transmission ofSARS-CoV-2

((or
or a closely related progenitor) from an animal reservoir host to humans,
which was followed by direct person-to-person transmission.
2. Introduction ofSARS-CoV-2 from an animal reservoir host to an intermediate animal host, where it then spread among the intermediate host, which
was then followed by zoonotic transmission to humans.
3. Similar to scenario 1 or 2 above, BUT introduction of SARS-CoV-2 to
humans is. through the cold/food chain; cold chain food products serve as
introduction and transmission among humans.
the vehicle of
of-introduction
4. SARS-CoV-2 is introduced to humans through a laboratory accident
accident where
release of the virus .is from an accidental infection of laboratory staff by
SARS-CoV-2.
Of these scenarios, only scenarios 1 and 2 were considered to be likely, with
scenario 2 being assessed as likely to very likely while scenario 1 was considered
possible to likely. The other two scenarios were considered to be possible (scenario 3) to extremely unlikely (scenario 4) by the WHO team (WHO-China
Study Team, 2021).
Under scenario·
scenario' 1, viruses very closely related to SARS-CoV-2 have been
found in insectivorous bats of the genus Rliinolophus
Rllinolophus in China, where COVID-19
was first detected (Lau et al.,
aI., 2020). However, other wild animal reservoir hosts
have been implicated such as the Malayan pangolin (Manis javanica)
java nica) or a member
of the weasel family (Mustelidae). The latter potential host is based on the susceptibility of
farm--nised mink (Neovisou
their ability
offarm-:raised
(Neovisoll vison) to SARS-CoV-2 and theirability
to transmit the virus to humans (Oude Munnink et al.,
aI., 2021).
Scenario 2 also involves a wild animal host but genetic evidence suggested
that an intermediate animal host may have been involved because the evolutionary distance between the viruses found in bats and SARS-CoV-2 was estimated
to be several decades (Lau et al., 2020). This scenario, where there has·been
has'been an
intermediate amplifying host has been seen in other emerging viruses, such as
& Fan,
the original SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV, and Hepinaviruses {Cui,
(Cui, Chen &
2017). Candidate species for the role of intermediate host include the Malayan
pangolin, mustelids and cat (felid)
(feEd) species, which could have been from wild animal farms that supply wet markets in China (WHO"."China
(WHO~China Study Team, 2021).
Although most agree that SARS-CoV-2 had a wildlife origin, there is some
dispute whether it came from direct animal to human transmission or whether
a laboratory accident was involved (Bloom et al.,
aI., 2021). The dispute centres
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around the Wuhan Institute of Virology, where virologists worked on
with genetic similarity to SARS-CoV
-2. In addition, the
SARS-CoV-2.
Disease Control (CDC) laboratory moved to a new location near
Market in Wuhan, China, where SARS.:.CoV-2
SARS.:..CoV-2 was first detected.
(2021) argue
argue that the scenario of an accidental release from a laboratory (sdena.'iio
tscc:!nario
4 above) should have b~en investigated more heavily by the WHO team alllll"~\T!l"
discounted too readily. Regardless, evidence suggests
from wild animals, most likely bats, but how it entered the
is still largely conjectural and unknown. From the perspective
ho,vever, understanding how the virus entered the human POPU.lat1,on
officials, ho\vever,
IJVIJUJLd.lJIUl1
is still critical information because it defines how mitigation measures
shaped to deal with future pandemics.

It seems th~
th~ process i~
i~ rather circular, as people have also infectedtii:h:ef
infected tith.ef"::"_
animals with SARS-CoV-2 - lions in. zoos, orangutans in Sumatra,",
Sumatra, _,
is"_~aid.;;"~:
and in mink farms, and we've even infected our pets -but
- but it is"_~aid.;;·/
for-~hes~"· that pets can't give us the virus back? What is the explanation for~,:hes~
transmission paths?
c

The evidence for spillover of SARS-CoV-2 fr()m
frC>m humans into novel animal.
hosts has become increasingly well-documented. For example, whole genome.
genome •
of- SARS-CoV-2 in farmed mink 'arid ·"
sequencing identified similar strains of-SARS-CoV-2
human workers on
and'tlie"
oh those farms, indicating that transmission occurred and
'die·
suspected~,
initial introduction from a human worker to the farmed mink was suspected~'
Human workers ?n
~:m these captive mink farms were subsequently infected ·from
"from
al., 2021).
mink carrying SARS-CoV-2 (Oude Munnink et aI.,
dorriesfiE petS~-·lias
pets~-· lias riot
oeeri --- ·Spillback of the virus from animals, such ·as
"as dorriestiE
notoeeri"""""
well-documented but could be likely depending on the pet. Such infections Will
will
probably be few and very localised because most pets are isolated from ~thers
~thers
outside their households and would not likely serve as dominant sources of infecin-fecis th-at
tion other than within their households. For example, the likely scenario isth"at
an infected owner might transmit SARS-CoV
V-2
-2 to their pet but would also serve
as the source of infection to other human members of the household. Thus, pets
would serve a very minor role in SARS-CoV-2 infections because the human·
sources of the infection would infect everyone else within a given household.
sources ·of
Therefore, humans would play the dominant role as SARS-CoV-2 sourcen5f
infection and household pets serving minor role. One exception to this wot'.ild
wo~ld
din:.
be where pets congregate, such as pet shops, animal shelters arid veterinary clin:'
ics, where an infected pet can infect other pets from different households arid
subsequently spread thevinis.
the vinis. This may partly explain why"
why- one=way"
one=way· ttansmis--~~ttansmis-"~~-"-"
sion from humans to domestic dogs and cats is mostly observed. In
In coronaviruses similar to SARS-CoV-2,transmission
SARS-CoV-2, transmission from domestic dogs to humans was
recently documented (Vlasova et aI.,
al., 2021). However, SARS-CoV-2 appears to
·. replicate poorly in domestic dogs, while domestic cats appear to be competent
hosts for the virus and are also .susceptible to airborne transmission of the. virus

a
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al., 2020). Thus, Burkholz et aI.
al. (2021) and Sharun et al. (2021) argue that
(Shi et aI.,
viral transfer from humans to farm animals and pets needs to be closely monitored to prevent the establishment of novel viral reservoirs for potential future
zoonotic transfer.
can· never prevent zoonotic infection and a better
Is it true that we can'
focus is on addressing the earliest pathway of transmission? .·

I am not sure we can never predict zoonotic infection with known pathogens
but predictions for most. future events are difficult. Nils Bohr, the pioneering
especially about
ab.out the
physicist, jokingly commented "Prediction is difficult :- especially
al., 2007, p. 106). Especially :with unknown pathogens,
future" (Petticrew et aI.,
such as ones that have never been· discovered in wild animal hosts, there is a
high degree of unpredictability in when, where, and how a zoonoti~
zoonoti~ infection of
humans will occur. Pathogen discovery alone will not solve the problem because
because
understanding the host dynamics for those pathogens. is critical to assess risk of
spillover. Some have developed systems that follow a probabilistic framework to
assess the risk of zoonotic spillover for emerging pathogens. For example, Grange
al. (2021) developed a risk assessment framework for 887 wildlife viruses in
et aI.
terms of their potential for spillover into humans. Although imperfect, such a
framework can be revised and adjusted as new information becomes available.
In addition, such frameworks identify lack of knowledge and can guide where
focussed research is needed. However, others argue, and demonstrate to a certain
degree, that zoonotic risk assessments are largely inaccurate because of the paucity of data, the uncertainties around current data, and biases in focussing on cer& Holmes, 2021)
2021)...·
tain wildlife and domestic anim~l
anim~l species (Wille, Geoghegan &
(Mustela
fttro) were found to be competent hosts of
For example, ferrets (Mus
tela ptttorit1s
ptttoritis Juro)
al.,
SARS-CoV-2 based on experimental inoculations with the virus (Shi et aI.,
2020). However, there may be genetic barriers for transmission ofSARS-CoV-2
al., 2021). These contradictory lines
lines
from infected humans to ferret (Sawatzki et aI.,
difficult_ to relysolely
rely solely on studies·ofh~st
of evidence make it difficult.
studies'ofh~st competency but also
require transmission studies to develop a complete picture of the process.
H~lmes (2021) argue that pathogen surveillance of peoWille, Geoghegan and H~lmes
ple is required at the human-:-animal interface, such as people working with raising
and slaughtering domestic animals, hunting animals such as bushmeat, to better
transmissi_on. This is similar to focussing on the earliest pathway of
assess zoonotic transmission.
transmission from animals to humans. I argue that both approaches have merit and
the combination of both would provide increased prevention coverage than each
approach considered separately. In addition, surveillance for pathogens of concern in wildlife populations are possible, given political will and financial com-=~"--~--'-'-"com-=~,,--~ __,-,-,,oflarge-scale surveillance of wildlife pathogens affecting
mitment. An example oflarge-scalesllrveillance
human and agricultural health is under the National Wildlife Disease Program in
(https://www.aphis.usda.gov/ap
his/ourfocus/wildlifedamagel
ourfocus/wildlifedamage/
the United States (https:llwww.aphis.usda.gov
laphisl
programs/nwdp); avian influenza viruses in waterfowl are tracked through a taral., 2014).
geted, designed surveillance program that covers the entire US (Bevins et aI.,
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1oniot1c :r,an1::,:
Thus, it is unlikely that a single approach will prevent future zo
ZO'OlllO[lCt)aIll::';
m],t1g;at(:~;
·, demics but a combination of approaches in a unified framework will m1tt1~~at,e:·
but probably not eliminate, the unpredictability of zoonotic outbreaks ~U''''' ·1-'<111,,"":
demics, In all of these and
and other approaches, the COVID-19 pandemic has
lighted the need for multi-disciplinary approaches that require
among the human, animal, and environmental se-ctors
se.ctors (Belay et al., 2017).
2017) ..,::

A lot of waste.goes
waste. goes into sewerage systems including prescribed and iUe-...
ille-.•·
drugs~ Sewage analysis has been used to detect diseases such
sucha~
.po!i(j~
gal drugst
a~ ,Po!i<f
or COVID-19. Does this in
wildlife?:,
iri turn affect marine life and other wildlifef
Even in the most modern·
\.vaste,vater .treatment
modern' countries with sophisticated \'vaste\Vater·
plants (WWTP), there are issues with pathogen pollution from sewage. This'~s
This+~s
more of a problem in developing countries where raw'sewage
raw·sewage from municipal';'
municipal.:.
ities is often dumped directly into natural waterways. One example
example of path?~
gens from sewage affecting wildlife is infection of southern sea otters (Enhydra
nereis) with the Toxoplasma gondii parasite originating from domestic .,
lutris tzereis)
faeces in cat litter that was flushed down toilets, passed through WWTP, and was
Infected sea otter populatioris
discharged into the ocean where it subsequently fofected
populations
Oessup
Qessup & Miller, 2011). Avian influenza viruses and some coronaviruses can be
detected in effluent from WWTP that
that is ]:,eing
l:,eing discharged into the environ.:..',
environ.:..·.
&. Ellenberg, 2015). Global surveillance for SARS-CoV.:..2
·, ment (Wigginton, Ye &
in municipalities now includes monitoring of sewage for SARS.;..CoV-2
SARS-'-CoV-2 RNA,
where COVID-19 outbreaks are often detected prior to reports in human individuals (Medema et aI.,
al., 2020). The basis for this surveillance is that.infection
with SARS-CoV-2 in humans also causes gastrointestinal symptoms, and the
detected·in Wastewater
wastewater
virus is passed through in faeces, which is subsequently detected'in
al., 2020). Based on this, Franklin and Bevins (2020) hypothesised
(Kitajima et aI.,
SARS-C:oV-2 released from WWTP had the potential to spillover into wild
that SARS-c:oV-2
mammals using aquatic habitats near where WWTP effluent was discharged
into the environment. One issue with this hypothesis is whether SARS-CoV-2
remains infective after undergoing the wastewater tr:eatment
treatment process. However,
a substantial amount of raw sewage is discharged into the environment through
accidental spills or when WWTP are overwhelmed during natural disasters, such
·, as hurricanes and floods (Franklin &
& Bevins, 2020). Such events have the potential to release infective SARS.:.CoV-2
SARS':"CoV-2 and other pathogens into the environment
where they can theoretically become established in wildlife hosts.

How do changes in climate such as drought and global warming,
deforestation, agricultural practices and eco-tourism affect zoonotic
transmission from wildlife?
This is a very broad area of interest with some specific examples that all of these
factors have contributed to transmission of zoonotic pathogens and increased
geographic spread of zoonotic pathogens. For example, climate change has
been implicated
the northward geographic expansion of tick-borne zoonotic

in
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(Brownstein, Holford &
Borrelia burgdo,feri,
burgdoiferi, the pathogen causing Lyme disease (BrownsteIn,
Fish 2005), deforestation has been implicated in decreasing wild mammalian
species diversity and increasing the prevalence of the zoonotic parasite causing
Chagas disease in the remaining small mammal hosts (Vaz,
D'f\ndrea & Jansen·
(Vaz,D'1\ndrea
2007), and changes in agricultural practices were considered responsible for the
(Epstein· et aI.,
al., 2006). A classic
emergence of Nipah virus in human populations (Epstein'
example of emergence of a novel zoonotic pathogen in response to anthropogenic
al., 2006). The emergence of
changes is with Nipah virus in Malaysia (Epstein et aI.,
Nipah virus from fruit bats (Pteropus spp.) coincided with agricultural intensificaet al., 2012) that included combining fruit trees v"ith
vvith pig farms and
tion (Pulliam eta!',
parti?,lly eaten fruit
where bats feeding on fruits in trees above pig pens dropped parti?-lly
pem (Epst~in
contaminated with infected saliva into the pig pens
(Epst~in et al., 2006). Pigs
became infected after consuming the virus-contaminated fruit and su?sequently
al., 2006).
infected workers on the farm and in slaughterhouses (Epstein et aI.,
In a review of 305 scientific articles, Gottdenker et al.
aL (2014) found that over
56% of the studies documented increased pathogen prevalence and/or transmission
in response to human-caused changes. Most of the positive responses
re.sponses were from
·viral
'viral and protozoan pathogens and the principal land use changes associated with
deforestation, ·agricultural development, and urbanisation.
those responses were deforestation,·
Most of the studies were·observational with only seven expedmental
experimental studies. Thus,
inferences about cause and effect were not possible in most cases:
cases~ However, proposed mechanisms included modified niches for pathogens and/or hosts, changes
. in host community composition, altered spatial distribution of species, and socioeconomic factors that altered human exposure and risk of pathogen transmission.
Land use-induced spillover of zoonotic pathogens is considered vitally important
pandemics·(Plowright etal.,
et al., 2021):
to understanding zoo:1otic
zoo~otic disease pandemics-(Plowright

How might we include a planetary health perspective to prevent the
3:nd spread of infectious disease and what do we humans
emergence Cl:nd
need to do differently?
the systems that spawn zoonotic pathogens, such
We need to better understand the
as SARS-CoV-2. Currently, we focus on understanding what species zoonotic
pathogens. emerge from but pay scant attention to the ecological systems from
where these pathogens emerged. This bias is probably because medical and veterinarian scientists initially promoted the concept of One Health, which focussed
primarily at zoonotic diseases at the human-domestic animal interface. It has
more·encomsince expanded more broadly to include wildlife ecology, with a more-encompassing definition for One Health as " ... a worldwide strategy for expanding
interdisciplinary collaborations and communications
-incall.~spects~of.health ~c-are
communications-in°all.,aspects~of.health
c~re .-'C:.....--=,·_cc:.....--=,environnieiit" and "A collaborative, multisectoral,
for people, animals and the environment"
and transdisciplinary approach (working at the local, regional, national, and
global levels) with the goal of achieving optimal health outcomes recognizing
the interconnection between people, animals, plants, and their shared environ_to tie together the disparate
ment" (Gibbs, 2014). Thus, One Health attempts .totie
0
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disciplines that deal with zoonotic diseases into a single collaborative framework
Currently, there is a large effort to incorporate One Health into global programs
under the WHO; the Food and Agriculture Organization of the tlnited Nations
(see "\-VWw.fao.org/one-health/en/).

Alan B. Franklin (1 June 2021)
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